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• Extraordinary concern due to accelerating 
incidents, asynchronous nature, effectiveness 
against US systems, and perceived vulnerability
• US systems dependent on elements known to be 
potential cyber vulnerabilities:  Software, anything 
that communicates, sensors, and networks




• The Defense Acquisition System cedes significant 
design control to the contractor and the PM needs 




• Successful cyber attacks on US systems and assets
• Fielded systems have unknown cyber vulnerabilities
• Reactive, system-level cyber vulnerability testing




• The Defense Acquisition System 
– Driven by Capabilities-Based (JCIDS) and Performance-
Based requirements (Performance Spec), that are 
designed to allow the contractor to control the design
– Purposely vague to garner maximum innovation
– Likely to omit or poorly define cyber performance 
needed by the warfighter
– Provides only a glimpse at the operational 
environment through the Operational Mode 
Summary/Mission Profile
– Cyber Security needs typically not apparent to system 
designers
Cyber Vulnerabilities Control
• The PM must know and control potential cyber 
vulnerabilities on their systems
– Thorough requirements and operational environment 
analyses to ensure cyber performance & potential 
vulnerabilities are known
– Design control over these elements and designation of 
potential vulnerabilities as Configuration Items (CI)
– Control use of COTS components, especially software, in 
cyber vulnerable subsystems to avoid proprietary and 
data rights restrictions
– Establish cyber test protocols for known system 
vulnerabilities to rapidly respond to new threats
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Helpful Tools, Techniques, & Analyses
• SEI’s Quality Attribute Workshop (QAW)
– A more complete inventory of cyber performance 
requirements
• MUIRS Analysis
– Analyses of typical cyber vulnerable areas
• SEI’s Architectural Trade-off Analysis Methodology sm
– Clarifies context and drives architectural design
– Connects user needs to system design to test program
• FMECA
























• PMs must know and control cyber 
vulnerabilities on their systems, which the 
DAS does not automatically support
• Using the tools, techniques, and analyses, 
will help identify and control vulnerabilities 
and establish testing protocols for new 
threats
• After gaining the full inventory of system 
cyber vulnerabilities, the RMF can be more 
efficiently and effectively supported
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